securityinput-validation

Input Validation security skill

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When & Why to Use This Skill

This Claude skill provides a robust security framework for input validation, designed to protect AI agents from hostile data and injection attacks. By enforcing strict trust boundaries and 'reject-by-default' principles, it mitigates critical vulnerabilities such as command injection, path traversal, and format string exploits, ensuring the integrity of terminal inputs, configuration files, and LLM responses.

Use Cases

  • Command Injection Prevention: Automatically sanitizing user-provided strings to ensure they are never passed directly to system shells or dangerous functions.
  • Path Traversal Defense: Validating and canonicalizing file paths to reject '..' sequences and prevent unauthorized access to sensitive system directories.
  • LLM Response Guardrails: Validating streaming chunks from language models at the trust boundary to prevent malicious content or formatting from affecting the host system.
  • Secure Configuration Loading: Exhaustively checking JSON configs and environment variables for correct type, length, and format before they are processed by internal functions.
  • Memory Safety & Buffer Protection: Preventing null byte injections and unchecked length vulnerabilities that could lead to C-style string truncation or bypasses.
namesecurity/input-validation
descriptionInput Validation security skill

Input Validation

All external data is hostile. Validate exhaustively at trust boundaries, reject by default.

ikigai Application

Trust boundaries in ikigai:

  • Terminal input (keystrokes, escape sequences)
  • Config files (JSON, paths)
  • LLM responses (streaming chunks)
  • Environment variables

Injection vectors:

  • Command injection: Never pass user strings to system() or popen()
  • Path traversal: Reject .., canonicalize paths before use
  • Format string: Never printf(user_input), always printf("%s", user_input)
  • Null byte: Truncates C strings, bypasses extension checks

Validation principles:

  • Allowlist over blocklist
  • Validate type, length, format, range
  • Reject on first failure
  • Sanitize for context (shell, SQL, HTML, ANSI)

After validation: Internal functions can assert() preconditions. The boundary function already validated.

Review red flags: User data in format strings, string concatenation for paths/commands, unchecked lengths.